



or-talk

← Thread → ← Date →

Re: ExcludeNodes setting bypassed

Scott Bennett

Sat, 13 Feb 2010 02:47:29 -0800

On Fri, 12 Feb 2010 22:24:35 -0500 Nick Mathewson <ni...@freehaven.net> wrote:

>On Fri, Feb 12, 2010 at 6:10 AM, <twinkletoedtur...@safe-mail.net> wrote:

>> This thread is being forked from the original as it doesn't entirely
>> depend on the user(s) using bridges and this problem. I understand
>> the purpose of Tor and know individuals, organizations, as well as
>> governments use Tor, so why be surprised when governments use Tor?
>> But if these individuals are correct, why are dc nodes making the
>> exception with ExcludeNodes and passing through? Is there an attack
>> on Tor certain nodes use to bypass this feature?

>>

>> From: Andrew Lewman

>>

```
>> "Yes, https://bugs.torproject.org/flyspray/index.php?do=3Ddetails&id=3D10
>90.
>> =A0We're still working on it. =A0In fact, we're working on rewriting the
>> entire codebase around {Exclude}{Entry|Exit}Nodes options."
>
>I'll try to expand on the understand the bug report you are citing,
>since the stuff there really _does_ explain what the problem is,
>albeit in programmer-speak.
>
>The root problem here is in the way that node selection was originally
>written. We needed to solve the question of, "what should we do when
>the user requests that only certain nodes be used, and then makes a
>request that those nodes cannot satisfy?" Some examples where
>excluding nodes can make it impossible to fulfill a request include:
> - Excluding a node, then choosing that node as the exit for a
>particular circuit.
> - Excluding every introduction point for a hidden service, then
>trying to connect to that hidden service.
> - Excluding every distributed directory point for a hidden service,
>then trying to look up its descriptor.
> - Operating a hidden service, when the client picks a rendezvous
>point you've excluded.
> - Trying to connect to an IP:Port when you have excluded every exit
>node that would support it.
> - Trying to bootstrap when you have excluded every directory authority.
>
>In *most* of these cases, we figured that recent requests should
>override old requests, so if the user says "don't do X" and then says
>"do X", they probably meant the latter rather than the former.
>Similarly, we figured that people mostly wanted their requests not to
>break, and would get irritated if excluding nodes meant that their
>hidden service requests could break at random. So (IIUC) we set up
>the code so that some service requests that could only be granted with
>excluded nodes would produce a warning rather than a complete failure.
>
>It turns out this wasn't the choice a lot of people want: they want to
>be able to say "Never ever ever use these nodes. If I ever make a
>request that can only be satisfied with nodes I've excluded, reject
>that request, even if it means I don't get the hidden services I want,
>or I can't bootstrap, or whatever." This isn't a crazy thing to ask
>for at all. As Andrew said, Roger's working on rewriting big chunks
```

>of the node selection code to support this feature. As Andrew said,
>check out Bug 1090 for the details and progress.
>
>(Another confusing aspect here is that "exclude X as an exit node" has
>been taken by some people to mean that all circuits ending at X should
>be verboten. But circuits can end at a node for reasons other than
>sending traffic out of the network, including accessing a hidden
>service via a rendezvous point, performing a self-test, or accessing a
>directory server. Perhaps what people really want is an
>ExcludeAsLastHop option, and we should build that instead.)
>

I'm afraid I don't see why this should be confusing at all. Circuits can end also at a directory server for internal (i.e., fully hidden and encrypted) access to directory information. Those circuits and circuits created for access to hidden services are **not** exit circuits, but rather are circuits that are built to some point in the tor network for non-exit purposes. ExcludeExitNodes specifications are inapplicable. ExcludeNodes specifications, OTOH, are absolutely applicable. "ExcludeAsLastHop" has yet to receive a justification at this point.

Scott Bennett, Comm. ASMELG, CFIAG

```
*****  
* Internet:          bennett at cs.niu.edu                               *  
*-----*  
* "A well regulated and disciplined militia, is at all times a good  *  
* objection to the introduction of that bane of all free governments *  
* -- a standing army."                                             *  
* -- Gov. John Hancock, New York Journal, 28 January 1790        *  
*****  
*****
```

To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to majord...@torproject.org with
unsubscribe or-talk in the body. <http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/>

- [RE: ExcludeNodes setting bypassed](#) *twinkletoedturtle*
 - [Re: ExcludeNodes setting bypassed](#) *Nick Mathewson*

- [Re: ExcludeNodes setting bypassed](#) *G-Lo* •
- [Re: ExcludeNodes setting bypassed](#) *Scott Bennett*

Reply via email to